People's War

The revolutionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and relying on them.

Source: "Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work" (January 27, 1934), Selected Works, Vol. I. p. 147.*

革命戰爭是群衆的戰爭，只有動員群衆才能進行戰爭，只有依靠群衆才能進行戰爭。

Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work — January 1934, on concrete methods and mass livelihood.

What is a true bastion of iron? It is the masses, the millions upon millions of people who genuinely and sincerely support the revolution. That is the real iron bastion which it is impossible, and absolutely impossible, for any force on earth to smash. The counter-revolution cannot smash us; on the contrary, we shall smash it. Rallying millions upon millions of people round the revolutionary government and expanding our revolutionary war, we shall wipe out all counter-revolution and take over the whole of China.

Source: Ibid., p. 150.*

真正的銅牆鐵壁是什麼？是群衆，是千百萬真心實意地擁護革命的群衆。這是真正的銅牆鐵壁，什麼力量也打不破的，完全打不破的。反革命打不破我們，我們卻要打破反革命。在革命政府的周圍團結起千百萬群衆來，發展我們的革命戰爭，我們就能消滅一切反革命，我們就能奪取全中國。

The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people. It is mainly because of the unorganized state of the Chinese masses that Japan dares to bully us. When this defect is remedied, then the Japanese aggressor, like a mad bull crashing into a ring of flames, will be surrounded by hundreds of millions of our people standing upright, the mere sound of their voices will strike terror into him, and he will be burned to death.

Source: "On Protracted War" (May 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 186.

戰爭的偉力之最深厚的根源，存在於民衆之中。日本敢於欺負我們，主要的原因在於中國民衆的無組織狀態。克服了這一缺點，就把日本侵略者置於我們數萬萬站起來了的人民之前，使它像一匹野牛衝入火陣，我們一聲喚也要把它嚇一大跳，這匹野牛就非燒死不可。

On Protracted War — May 1938, early in the Sino-Japanese War. Predicts a long war and a strategy of trading space for time.

The imperialists are bullying us in such a way that we will have to deal with them seriously. Not only must we have a powerful regular army, we must also organize contingents of the people's militia on a big scale. This will make it difficult for the imperialists to move a single inch in our country in the event of invasion.

Source: Interview with a Hsinhua News Agency correspondent (September 29, 1958).

帝國主義者如此欺負我們，這是需要認真對付的。我們不但要有強大的正規軍，我們還要大辦民兵師。這樣，在帝國主義侵略我國的時候，就會使他們寸步難行。

Considering the revolutionary war as a whole, the operations of the people's guerrillas and those of the main forces of the Red Army complement each other like a man's right arm and left arm, and if we had only the main forces of the Red Army without the people's guerrillas, we would be like a warrior with only one arm. In concrete terms, and especially with regard to military operations, when we talk of the people in the base area as a factor, we mean that we have an armed people. That is the main reason why the enemy is afraid to approach our base area.

Source: "Problems of Strategy in China 's Revolutionary War" (December 1936), Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 238.

人民的游擊戰爭，從整個革命戰爭的觀點看來，和主力紅軍是互為左右手，只有主力紅軍而無人民的游擊戰爭，就像一個獨臂將軍。根據地的人民條件，具體地說來，特別是對於作戰說來，就是有武裝起來了的人民。敵人視為畏途，主要地也在這一點。

Unquestionably, victory or defeat in war is determined mainly by the military, political, economic and natural conditions on both sides. But not by these alone. It is also determined by each side's subjective ability in directing the war. In his endeavour to win a war, a military strategist cannot overstep the limitations imposed by the material conditions; within these limitations, however, he can and must strive for victory. The stage of action for a military strategist is built upon objective material conditions, but on that stage he can direct the performance of many a drama, full of sound and colour, power and grandeur.

Source: Ibid., pp. 190-91.*

戰爭勝負，主要地決定於作戰雙方的軍事、政治、經濟、自然諸條件，這是沒有問題的。然而不僅僅如此，還決定於作戰雙方主觀指導的能力。軍事家不能超過物質條件許可的範圍外企圖戰爭的勝利，然而軍事家可以而且必須在物質條件許可的範圍內爭取戰爭的勝利。軍事家活動的舞臺建築在客觀物質條件的上面，然而軍事家憑著這個舞臺，卻可以導演出許多有聲有色威武雄壯的活劇來。

The object of war is specifically "to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy" (to destroy the enemy means to disarm him or "deprive him of the power to resist", and does not mean to destroy every member of his forces physically). In ancient warfare, the spear and the shield were used, the spear to attack and destroy the enemy, and the shield to defend and preserve oneself. To the present day, all weapons are still an extension of the spear and the shield. The bomber, the machine-gun, the long-range gun and poison gas are developments of the spear, while the air-raid shelter, the steel helmet, the concrete fortification and the gas mask are developments of the shield. The tank is a new weapon combining the functions of both spear and shield. Attack is the chief means of destroying the enemy, but defence cannot be dispensed with. In attack the immediate object is to destroy the enemy, but at the same time it is self-preservation, because if the enemy is not destroyed, you will be destroyed. In defence the immediate object is to preserve yourself, but at the same time defence is a means of supplementing attack or preparing to go over to the attack. Retreat is in the category of defence and is a continuation of defence, while pursuit is a continuation of attack. It should be pointed out that destruction of the enemy is the primary object of war and self-preservation the secondary, because only by destroying the enemy in large numbers can one effectively preserve oneself. Therefore attack, the chief means of destroying the enemy, is primary, while defence, a supplementary means of destroying the enemy and a means of selfpreservation, is secondary. In actual warfare the chief role is played by defence much of the time and by attack for the rest of the time, but if war is taken as a whole, attack remains primary.

Source: "On Protracted War" (May 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 156.

戰爭的目的不是別的，就是「保存自己，消滅敵人」（消滅敵人，就是解除敵人的武裝，也就是所謂「剝奪敵人的抵抗力」，不是要完全消滅其肉體）。古代戰爭，用矛用盾：矛是進攻的，為了消滅敵人；盾是防禦的，為了保存自己。直到今天的武器，還是這二者的繼續。轟炸機、機關槍、遠射程炮、毒氣，是矛的發展；防空掩蔽部、鋼盔、水泥工事、防毒面具，是盾的發展。坦克，是矛盾二者結合為一的新式武器。進攻，是消滅敵人的主要手段，但防禦也是不能廢的。進攻，是直接為了消滅敵人的，同時也是為了保存自己，因為如不消滅敵人，則自己將被消滅。防禦，是直接為了保存自己的，但同時也是輔助進攻或準備轉入進攻的一種手段。退卻，屬於防禦一類，是防禦的繼續；而追擊，則是進攻的繼續。應該指出：戰爭目的中，消滅敵人是主要的，保存自己是第二位的，因為只有大量地消滅敵人，才能有效地保存自己。因此，作為消滅敵人之主要手段的進攻是主要的，而作為消滅敵人之輔助手段和作為保存自己之一種手段的防禦，是第二位的。戰爭實際中，雖有許多時候以防禦為主，而在其餘時候以進攻為主，然而通戰爭的全體來看，進攻仍然是主要的。

On Protracted War — May 1938, early in the Sino-Japanese War. Predicts a long war and a strategy of trading space for time.

All the guiding principles of military operations grow out of the one basic principle: to strive to the utmost to preserve one's own strength and destroy that of the enemy… How then do we justify the encouragement of heroic sacrifice in war? Every war exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high one. Is this not in contradiction with "preserving oneself"? In fact, there is no contradiction at all; to put it more exactly, sacrifice and self-preservation are both opposite and complementary to each other. For such sacrifice is essential not only for destroying the enemy but also for preserving oneself partial and temporary "non-preservation" (sacrifice, or paying the price) is necessary for the sake of general and permanent preservation. From this basic principle stems the series of principles guiding military operations, all of which - from the principles of shooting (taking cover to preserve oneself, and making full use of fire-power to destroy the enemy) to the principles of strategy - are permeated with the spirit of this basic principle. All technical principles and all principles concerning tactics, campaigns and strategy represent applications of this basic principle. The principle of preserving oneself and destroying the enemy is the basis of all military principles.

Source: "Problems of Strategy in Guerilla War Against Japan " (May 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, pp. 81-82.*

一切軍事行動的指導原則，都根據於一個基本的原則，就是：儘可能地保存自己的力量，消滅敵人的力量。……何以解釋戰爭中提倡勇敢犧牲呢？每一戰爭都須支付代價，有時是極大的代價，豈非和「保存自己」相矛盾？其實一點也不矛盾，正確點說，是相反相成的。因為這種犧牲，不但是為了消滅敵人的必要，也是為了保存自己的必要——部分的暫時的「不保存」（犧牲或支付），是為了全體的永久的保存所必需的。在這個基本的原則上，發生了指導整個軍事行動的一系列的所謂原則，從射擊原則（廕庇身體，發揚火力，前者為了保存自己，後者為了消滅敵人）起，到戰略原則止，都貫徹這個基本原則的精神。一切技術的、戰術的、戰役的、戰略的原則，都是執行這個基本原則時的條件。保存自己消滅敵人的原則，是一切軍事原則的根據。

Our principles of operation are: 1. Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first; attack concentrated, strong enemy forces later. 2. Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later. 3. Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective. Holding or seizing a city or place is the outcome of wiping out the enemy's effective strength, and often a city or place can be held or seized for good only after it has changed hands a number of times. 4. In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing the enemy crushing blows, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and an attack on one or both of his flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or only break even. In this way, although inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers), we shall be absolutely superior in every part and every specific campaign, and this ensures victory in the campaign. As time goes on, we shall become superior as a whole and eventually wipe out all the enemy. 5. Fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves. 6. Give full play to our style of fighting - courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time without rest). 7. Strive to wipe out the enemy when he is on the move. At the same time, pay attention to the tactics of positional attack and capture enemy fortified points and cities. 8. With regard to attacking cities, resolutely seize all enemy fortified points and cities which are weakly defended. At opportune moments, seize all enemy fortified points and cities defended with moderate strength, provided circumstances permit. As for all strongly defended enemy fortified points and cities, wait till conditions are ripe and then take them. 9. Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army's main sources of manpower and materiel are at the front. 10. Make good use of the intervals between campaigns to rest, train and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training and consolidation should not in general be very long, and the enemy should so far as possible be permitted no breathing space. These are the main methods the People's Liberation Army has employed in defeating Chiang Kai-shek. They are the result of the tempering of the People's Liberation Army in long years of fighting against domestic and foreign enemies and are completely suited to our present situation… our strategy and tactics are based on a people's war; no army opposed to the people can use our strategy and tactics.

Source: "The Present Situation and Our Tasks" (December 25, 1947), Selected Military Writings, 2nd ed., pp. 349-50.*

我們的軍事原則是：（1）先打分散和孤立之敵，後打集中和強大之敵。（2）先取小城市、中等城市和廣大鄉村，後取大城市。（3）以殲滅敵人有生力量為主要目標，不以保守或奪取城市和地方為主要目標。保守或奪取城市和地方，是殲滅敵人有生力量的結果，往往需要反覆多次才能最後地保守或奪取之。（4）每戰集中絕對優勢兵力（兩倍、三倍、四倍、有時甚至是五倍或六倍於敵之兵力），四面包圍敵人，力求全殲，不使漏網。在特殊情況下則採用給敵以殲滅性打擊的方法，即集中全力打敵正面及其一翼或兩翼，求達殲滅其一部、擊潰其另一部的目的，以便我軍能夠迅速轉移兵力殲擊他部敵軍。力求避免打那種得不償失的、或得失相當的消耗戰。這樣，在全體上，我們是劣勢（就數量來說），但在每一個局部上，在每一個具體戰役上，我們是絕對的優勢，這就保證了戰役的勝利。隨著時間的推移，我們就將在全體上轉變為優勢，直到殲滅一切敵人。（5）不打無準備之仗，不打無把握之仗，每戰都應力求有準備，力求在敵我條件對比下有勝利的把握。（6）發揚勇敢戰鬥、不怕犧牲、不怕疲勞和連續作戰（即在短期內不休息地接連打幾仗）的作風。（7）力求在運動中殲滅敵人。同時，注重陣地攻擊戰術，奪取敵人的據點和城市。（8）在攻城問題上，一切敵人守備薄弱的據點和城市，堅決奪取之。一切敵人有中等程度的守備、而環境又許可加以奪取的據點和城市，相機奪取之。一切敵人守備強固的據點和城市，則等候條件成熟時然後奪取之。（9）以俘獲敵人的全部武器和大部人員，補充自己。我軍人力物力的來源，主要在前線。（10）善於利用兩個戰役之間的間隙，休息和整訓部隊。休整的時間，一般地不要過長，儘可能不使敵人獲得喘息的時間。以上這些，就是人民解放軍打敗蔣介石的主要的方法。這些方法，是人民解放軍在和國內外敵人長期作戰的鍛鍊中產生出來，並完全適合我們目前的情況的。……我們的戰略戰術是建立在人民戰爭這個基礎上的，任何反人民的軍隊都不能利用我們的戰略戰術。

Without preparedness superiority is not real superiority and there can be no initiative either. Having grasped this point, a force which is inferior but prepared can often defeat a superior enemy by surprise attack.

Source: "On Protracted War" (May 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, pp. 165-66.

優勢而無準備，不是真正的優勢，也沒有主動。懂得這一點，劣勢而有準備之軍，常可對敵舉行不意的攻勢，把優勢者打敗。

On Protracted War — May 1938, early in the Sino-Japanese War. Predicts a long war and a strategy of trading space for time.